Developing Index Based Livestock Insurance for managing livestock asset risks in Northern Kenya by Chantarat, S. et al.
NORMAN E. BORLAUG LEADERSHIP ENHANCEMENT IN AGRICULTURE PROGRAM    
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA - DAVIS !!!258 HUNT HALL  !!DAVIS, CALIFORNIA 95616  USA
  PHONE 530-752-1724  !  FAX 530-752-7523 !  E-MAIL BorlaugLEAP@ucdavis.edu !  WEB leap.ucdavis.edu
N
O
R
M
A
N
 B
O
R
LA
U
G
 L
EA
P
Research Brief F07-10-03-LEAP March 2010
This study develops an index-based livestock insurance (IBLI) product for managing key livestock asset risks of pastoralists in 
the arid and semi-arid lands of northern Kenya, where insurance markets are effectively absent and uninsured risk exposure 
is a main cause of persistent poverty. It uses a combination of field experiments and surveys conducted in summer 2008, and 
pre-existing household-level panel data sets in: (1) designing a market-viable contract; (2) conducting ex-ante household-
level welfare analysis; and (3) eliciting willingness to pay (WTP) for the product among the targeted population. IBLI 
offers compensation based on a predicted location aggregate livestock mortality index constructed from a strong statistical 
relationship between household herd mortality rates and high quality, objectively verifiable, remotely-sensed measures of 
vegetative cover on rangelands that are not manipulable by insured parties. It thus has potential to resolve the transaction 
costs and asymmetric information problems that cripple traditional insurance. The presence of a threshold-based poverty 
trap in East African pastoralism leads to nonlinear IBLI valuation, as found both in the simulation-based welfare analysis 
and in WTP estimates elicited through field surveys and experiments. This implies that IBLI could be both a commercially 
viable insurance product for better-off pastoralists, as well as a pro-poor instrument to use as a safety net for pastoralists 
vulnerable to losing their herds and collapsing into chronic poverty. The IBLI contract originally designed in this study has 
been slightly modified and launched in a pilot in January 2010 in the Marsabit district of northern Kenya by a Kenyan 
commercial insurer with retail distribution/brokerage by a leading private financial institution, international reinsurance 
by Swiss Reinsurance, with the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) leading the effort and the associated 
monitoring and evaluation program.
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Background and Methods
In Kenya’s arid and semi arid lands (ASALs), catastrophic 
livestock loss, especially induced from drought, is the 
most pervasive hazard encountered by households on 
a widespread level. This is especially true for northern 
Kenya, where more than 3 million pastoralist households 
are regularly hit by increasingly severe droughts. In 
the past 100 years, northern Kenya recorded 28 major 
droughts, four of which occurred in the last 10 years. For 
livelihoods that rely solely or partly on livestock, the risk 
– and especially the realization – of catastrophic livestock 
mortality losses has devastating effects, driving them into 
extreme poverty and making it difficult for them to escape 
once they fall destitute.  
The economic and social returns to an effective program 
that insures the pastoral and agro-pastoral population 
against catastrophic livestock losses can be substantial. 
First, because it provides indemnity payments after a 
shock, livestock insurance should help stem the collapse 
of vulnerable-but-presently-non-poor households into the 
ranks of the poor following a drought due to irreversible 
losses from which they do not recover. Second, insuring 
assets against catastrophic loss lessens the high risk of 
investment in such environments. This should improve 
incentives for households to build their asset base and 
climb out of poverty. Third, private creditors presently 
unwilling to lend for such ventures due to the covariate 
risk associated with big shocks like drought might become 
willing to lend if the assets that secure their loans could be 
insured. Insurance can thereby “crowd-in” much-needed 
credit for enterprises in the region without leaving poor 
ASAL residents excessively vulnerable to losing assets 
when nature fails them. 
Formal insurance, especially against covariate livestock 
loss, is rarely available for small-scale pastoral households 
in high risk, infrastructure-deficient areas due to problems 
of asymmetric information, transaction costs and 
covariate risk. Index based livestock insurance (IBLI) 
offers a means to fill in this missing market. In contrast to 
traditional insurance, which makes indemnity payments 
based on the actual loss of the insured, IBLI pays out 
based on an objectively and transparently measured index 
(e.g., rainfall, predicted livestock loss based on objectively 
measured vegetative condition, etc.) that is strongly 
associated with insurable loss but cannot be influenced 
by both contract parties.
By construction, IBLI thus avoids the twin asymmetric 
information problems of adverse selection and moral 
hazard as no contract party can influence the probability 
of insurance payment. Transaction costs of monitoring 
 
and verification of the insurance contracts can also be 
substantially reduced, as now insurance companies and 
insured clients need only monitor the index to know when 
a claim is due and indemnity payments must be made. They 
do not need to confirm the veracity and cause of individual 
losses. Finally, properly indexing locally covariate risk opens 
up opportunities for risk transfer into a broader risk pool via 
international capital markets. These advantages, however, 
come at a cost of spatial or intertemporal “basis risk”, which 
results from the necessarily imperfect correlation between 
the index and any individual’s loss experience. 
Given these tradeoffs and the novelty of the IBLI concept – 
especially among a previously-uninsured population – the 
key challenges in developing IBLI in northern Kenya were: 
(1) identifying high quality data that could serve as an 
objectively measured indicator – it has to be available cost-
effectively in near-real-time and not manipulable by contract 
parties; (2) statistically establishing a an optimal insurance 
index based on a strong relationship between household-level 
livestock loss and the objectively measured indicator; (3) 
crafting contract terms that are easy to understand and that 
match the risk management needs of the targeted clientele; 
and (4) building informed demand for the contract among 
a target clientele largely unfamiliar with insurance. 
To address these challenges, we focus our study on five 
locations in Marsabit District in northern Kenya, where 
extensive prior research has identified covariate livestock 
mortality as a key uninsured risk faced by communities and 
where there already exist two sources of household-level 
panel data sets: (i) an annual one from the Government of 
Kenya’s Arid Land Resource Management Project (ALRMP), 
from 2000-present, and (ii) quarterly data 2000-2002 
from the USAID Global Livestock Collaborative Research 
Support Program’s (GL-CRSP) “Improving Pastoral Risk 
Management on East African Rangelands” (PARIMA) 
project.
Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI).  NDVI 
represents the best candidate for a high quality, objectively 
measured indicator of covariate risk of livestock loss in 
this region. Constructed from data remotely sensed from 
satellites, NDVI reflects the level of photosynthetic activity 
in the vegetation observed in a given location. As livestock 
in pastoral production systems depend almost entirely on 
available forage for nutrition, NDVI serves as a strong 
indicator of the vegetation available for livestock to consume. 
Surveys and experiments.  In-depth household and community 
field surveys and simple experiments were conducted in the 
five study locations. The community survey was first fielded 
among approximately 15-20 key informants to present the 
concept of IBLI, exchange ideas and solicit their impressions 
and opinion about the appropriate contract design. A more 
in-depth household survey was then conducted in June-
July 2008. Forty-two (42) households in each location 
were randomly drawn using sampling stratified by three 
livestock wealth classes. These sampled households were 
later brought together to take part in an experimental game 
designed to replicate existing pastoral production systems, 
which we used to illustrate how IBLI would work. Having 
educated participants on the general structure of IBLI, we 
then returned to each household for a follow-up interview 
where we used contingent valuation methods to elicit and 
understand respondents’ willingness-to-pay (WTP) for 
insurance. The research methodology uses the survey data 
to complement existing data sets in designing the IBLI 
contract, performing simulation-based welfare analysis and 
studying WTP patterns.
Findings
Designing the IBLI contract.  An empirical forecasting 
relationship between seasonal area-average livestock 
mortality and vegetation index was estimated using 10 
years of ALRMP and NDVI data. The NDVI series were 
standardized to control for heterogeneity of non-climate 
factors across locations. Due to the cumulative nature of 
drought-induced livestock loss, cumulative vegetation 
variables were constructed as the main explanatory variables. 
The seasonal forecasting relationships were estimated using 
a regime switching model, where the cumulative vegetation 
outcome observed at the end of the season determines the 
regime (either good-vegetation year or bad-year regime) 
for which the empirical relationship between NDVI and 
livestock mortality was established. This approach captures 
how livestock mortality response to vegetation conditions 
differed between good and bad rainfall years.
Ultimately, two spatially distinct clusters were identified, one 
for the Chalbi (a very arid zone of camel and smallstock-
based pastoralism) and the other for Laisamis (a semi-arid 
zone with cattle and smallstock-based pastoralism). The 
predictive relationships performed very well out-of-sample 
(when tested against the PARIMA data), predicting 
household-specific mortality loss with 87% probability of 
forecasting errors within 10% of the true value, and correctly 
triggering insurance payout 75-88% of the time. 
A location-specific predicted seasonal livestock mortality 
index can then be constructed based on historical 
observations of NDVI data and the regime switching model 
estimates. Seasonal IBLI contracts were developed for each 
location using these predicted livestock mortality indices to 
trigger insurance payments. Pastoralists pay the premium 
before the season starts and receive an indemnity payment at 
the end of the season if the predicted morality index exceeds 
the pre-specified strike level. Both the premium and the 
indemnity are proportional to the total value of livestock 
insured, which the pastoralist chooses. The actuarially 
fair seasonal premium rates vary across locations due to 
heterogeneity in vegetation condition, from 2.2-4.9% of 
total insured livestock value for a 10% strike contract, down 
to 0.5-1.5% for a 20% strike contract. Risk exposure analysis 
of the insurance underwriter suggested that a high degree 
of spatial and temporal aggregate risk diversification could 
be achieved with IBLI.
Simulated welfare analysis of IBLI contract.  We then 
conducted an ex ante evaluation of the effectiveness of 
IBLI in northern Kenya, where prior empirical research 
has found strong evidence of threshold-based poverty traps 
characterized by at least one herd threshold of around 
15 tropical livestock units (TLU) below which livestock 
accumulation collapses, and above which livestock grows 
over time to a much higher equilibrium herd size. We built 
a dynamic structural model of household wealth dynamics 
and parameterized it using rich panel data from ALRMP, 
PARIMA and experimental risk preference data elicited in 
the 2008 survey. The simulations allowed us to establish 
the likely welfare effects of IBLI and to investigate patterns 
of household-specific willingness to pay for this asset index 
insurance. 
The simulation results indicate that the welfare effects 
of IBLI vary greatly across households. Due to the asset 
threshold-based poverty trap, IBLI is most valuable to 
vulnerable non-poor households when it protects their herd 
from falling beneath the critical threshold and thus helps 
them avert a collapse into destitution. It provides the least 
welfare improvement for the poorest households, who are 
already beneath the herd size threshold and for whom paying 
for IBLI premium accelerates their decline into destitution. 
The largest, non-vulnerable herd owners benefit significantly 
from IBLI as well, although not as much as the vulnerable 
non-poor. The estimated welfare effects of IBLI are thus 
highly nonlinear in individual herd size, peaking for those 
at or slightly above the critical herd threshold. Initial herd 
size thus was found to be the key dominating determinant 
of IBLI performance in this setting, not basis risk, location 
or individual risk preferences.
Since the greatest value of IBLI arises due to its provision 
of an effective safety net, we then explored the likelihood 
of commercial uptake among those who might otherwise 
need assistance. For the 10% strike contract that has the 
greatest estimated welfare effects, only those with relatively 
large herds would be willing to pay commercial mark-ups 
(above actuarially fair rates) of at least 20%, corroborating 
our survey evidence that WTP among vulnerable groups 
may not suffice to stimulate uptake of commercially viable 
contracts, which typically have mark-ups of 30-50% to cover 
insurer costs and profits. We then used simulations to show 
that targeted subsidization of IBLI premiums might serve 
quite effectively as a safety net program. Indeed, this appears 
more cost-effective in reducing headcount poverty measures 
than direct need-based transfers to the poor.  
Investigating demand for IBLI using field experiments.  IBLI 
demand estimated using structural dynamic simulation 
models can be compared with the estimated willingness-to-
pay (WTP) based on survey data.  Pastoralists were asked 
to decide what proportion of their herd they would wish to 
insure. Then, conditional on their chosen proportion, they 
were asked a sequence of dichotomous WTP questions, 
responses to which were used to form bounds for their 
unobserved WTP. We then estimated WTP conditional on 
household-specific characteristics. 
Wealth, risk preferences, perceived basis risk and a herder’s 
subjective expectation of herd loss are the key WTP 
determinants, conditional on understanding how IBLI 
works. The mean proportion of herd that respondents chose 
to insure was nearly 70%. Mean WTP only marked up 
the actuarially fair rate by an average of 15%, not enough 
to generate effective demand for a commercially viable 
contract. As in the simulation-based analysis, estimated 
aggregate demand appears highly price elastic. At a 30% 
mark up on actuarially fair rates, effective IBLI demand 
drops to only 16% of the sample. Those households most 
vulnerable to falling into a poverty trap exhibited the highest 
price elasticity of demand, despite their potentially higher 
dynamic welfare gains from the insurance. 
Practical Implications
The IBLI contract originally designed in this study has been 
slightly modified and launched in a pilot in January 2010 
in the Marsabit district of northern Kenya by a Kenyan 
commercial insurer, UAP Provincial Insurance Company 
Ltd., with retail distribution/brokerage by a leading private 
financial institution, Equity Bank, and international 
reinsurance by Swiss Reinsurance, with the International 
Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) leading the effort and 
the associated monitoring and evaluation program. This 
outcome is very encouraging. But it also opens up further 
research questions the team intends to pursue.
First, complex index insurance products can be difficult 
to understand, especially for populations with low levels 
of literacy and minimal previous experience with formal 
insurance products. Preliminary field experiments show 
significant promise for simulation games played by 
prospective insurance purchasers as a means for both 
explaining how index insurance products work and 
generating product demand (Lybbert et al., 2009). 
Second, development of cost-effective agent networks for 
reliable, low-cost product marketing and service remains a 
challenge. In the northern Kenya IBLI case, our commercial 
partners can tap into a network of local agents equipped with 
electronic, solar rechargeable point-of-sale (POS) devices 
being extended throughout northern Kenya by a commercial 
bank working with the central government and donors 
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on a new cash transfer program. These POS devices can be 
easily configured to accept premium payments and to register 
indemnity payments for certain insurance contracts. Financial 
sector interests are attracted by the potential economies of scope 
involved in introducing another range of products for devices 
otherwise used purely for government transfers and debit 
payments. It remains to be seen how large these economies of 
scope will prove and how replicable this model will be without 
the fortuitous existence of a POS network. 
Third, IBLI underwriters and their commercial partners must 
make difficult choices in balancing the administrative simplicity 
and marketing appeal of offering IBLI contracts priced 
uniformly over space and time, versus more complex pricing to 
guard against the possibility of spatial or intertemporal adverse 
selection. Little is known about these tradeoffs.
These implementation challenges notwithstanding, IBLI shows 
considerable promise in the pastoral areas of East Africa. By 
addressing serious problems of covariate risk, asymmetric 
information and high transactions costs that have precluded 
the emergence of commercial insurance in these areas to date, 
IBLI offers a novel opportunity to use financial risk transfer 
mechanisms to address a key driver of persistent poverty. The 
basic design should be replicable in other locations where 
covariate risk exposure is significant and existing insurance 
products do not adequately meet households’ insurance needs. 
Extended time series of remotely sensed data are available 
worldwide at high quality and low cost. Wherever there also 
exist longitudinal household-level data on an insurable interest 
(livestock, health status, crop yields, etc.), similar types of 
index insurance can be designed using the basic techniques 
outlined here.
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